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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Respondent Chevron U.S.A. Inc. ("Chevron") agrees with
Appellant Sandy City that jurisdiction is conferred upon this
Court.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Chevron agrees that this is an appeal taken from a
judgment of dismissal entered against Sandy City on defendants'
motions for summary judgment, and that the Order of Dismissal
was entered on April 8, 1988.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Chevron disagrees with Sandy's description of issues
presented on appeal.

Chevron believes there is a single issue

presented, and that is whether or not, based on the material
undisputed facts and the law, the action of Sandy City should
have been dismissed.
STATUTES, RULES AND ORDINANCES DETERMINATIVE OF ISSUES
The interpretation of the following enactments, set
forth in addenda to this brief, is determinative in this
appeal:

(1) Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

(Addendum 1A); (2) Section 10-2-418 of the Utah Code Annotated
(Addendum IB); (3) Section 10-1-104(11), Utah Code Annotated
(Addendum 1C); and (4) Section 19.84.090 of the Salt Lake
County Ordinances (Addendum ID). Chevron does not believe that
the other enactments cited by Sandy are either relevant or
determinative.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This action involves a Chevron service station located
on a 0.7 acre parcel on the northwest corner of 10600 South and
1300 East Streets in unincorporated Salt Lake County.

Sandy

City commenced this action in the District Court after the Salt
Lake County Commission upheld the decision of the Salt Lake
County Planning Commission granting a conditional use permit to
Chevron's agent, Postero-Blecker, Inc.
Chevron to develop its facility.

This permit allowed

Sandy alleged that the

decision to grant the conditional use permit violated state
statute and county ordinances, and that the decision was
arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.

Sandy also attacked

the Salt Lake County Commission's prior decision to rezone for
commercial uses a larger 4.18 acre parcel containing the
Chevron parcel.
Separate motions for summary judgment were filed in
January 1988 by Chevron, the Salt Lake County defendants, and
defendants Yeates, Priest, Kjar and Smoot.

Sandy City filed a

cross-motion for summary judgment against defendants, and a
motion to strike portions of defendants affidavits and
memoranda.

All parties' motions for summary judgment were

heard by the Court on February 5, 1988.

On February 18, 1988,

defendant Salt Lake County moved for an order certifying to the
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District Court the record of all proceedings before the Salt
Lake County Planning Commission and County Commission on the
contested zoning and conditional use applications.

An indexed

copy of this record (the "County Record") was filed with the
Court at hearing of Salt Lake County's motion on February 25,
1988, and is now part of the record on appeal.

On March 15,

1988, the District Court entered a memorandum decision granting
all defendants' motions for summary judgment, and denying Sandy
City's motion for summary judgment and motion to strike.

On

April 8, 1988, the Court entered its Order and Judgment of
Dismissal dismissing Sandy City's complaint.

Sandy City then

filed its Notice of Appeal, and this appeal follows.
II.
STATUTORY SCHEME FOR ZONING AND BUILDING
Pursuant to § 10-9-1, et seq., Utah Code Annotated,
1987-1988, a municipality is empowered to act with respect to
zoning and building permit matters affecting lands within
municipality boundaries.

The County Record was added to the record on appeal by
order of the Court of Appeals on September 20, 1988, upon
stipulation of all parties. The County Record is not numbered
consecutively, but rather consists of six individually indexed
envelopes. Citations to the County Record in this brief will
be made by envelope and document number, e.g. Envelope 2, Doc.
4.
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A county is empowered to act with respect to zoning
and building permit matters affecting lands within the
unincorporated areas of a county (§ 17-27-1, et seq., Utah Code
Annotated, 1987-1988).
The foregoing is the jurisdiction to which the public
must normally look as concerns zoning, zoning changes,
non-conforming uses and building permits.

That was the

statutory scheme at the time of the events which are the
subject of this action.
Correlatively, it is a municipal obligation to furnish
services and to have revenue powers within municipality
boundaries.

And, it is the county obligation to furnish

services within the unincorporated areas of a county and to
have revenue powers therein.
The foregoing lines of authority are well-defined and
have been well-established historically.

There has been no

reason for guess work as to where an interested party would go
for approvals for land use and building permits.
Section 10-2-418, Utah Code Annotated, 1987-1988, set
forth hereinafter, impacts on the foregoing provisions.

It was

intended to allow a municipality to annex, under defined
conditions, lands not otherwise within an incorporated area.
Those conditions are well-stated.
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(a)

The municipality may propose a Municipal

expansion policy if it chooses for lands within one-half mile
of the municipality.
contained in said

Section 10-2-414 sets forth what must be

?,

policy declaration."

The said policy

declaration in effect amounts to a preliminary guideline.
(b)

The municipality must be "willing to annex the

territory proposed for such development."
Assuming that a municipality has either not adopted a
policy declaration meeting the requirements of § 10-2-414 or
has not manifested a "willingness to annex" in the manner
required by § 10-2-415, then § 10-2-418 does not come into play
and the jurisdiction as to unincorporated lands within a county
would remain within the jurisdiction of the county.
III.
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
The following are the undisputed facts upon which the
District Court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants
and against plaintiff Sandy City.

Although Sandy attempts to

state the unrefuted facts, Sandy's brief fails to set forth a
great many of the important undisputed facts.

Other facts

stated by Sandy as unrefuted are argumentative, not referenced
to the record and not material.
are as follows:
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The material undisputed facts

THE PARTIES
1.

Sandy City is a Utah municipality with powers

granted by Utah statute.
2.

Defendant Salt Lake County is a subdivision of

the State of Utah organized and functioning under the authority
of Title 17 of the Utah Code.

Defendant Salt Lake County

Planning Commission is a commission duly appointed by Salt Lake
County and operating under the authority of Chapter 27, Title
17, of the Utah Code.
3.

Defendants Chevron and Postero-Blecker, Inc. are,

respectively, Pennsylvania and Arizona corporations authorized
to do business in Utah.

Postero-Blecker acted as Chevron's

ag^ent in land acquisition and permitting.
4.

Defendants Yeates, Priest, Kjar and Smoot (the

"Individual Defendants") were the owners of a 4.18 acre parcel
of land located at the northwest corner of 10600 South and 1300
East Streets in unincorporated Salt Lake County, described in
this brief as the "Original Property."

(R. 003-004).

JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
5.

At the time these proceedings commenced, Chevron,

through its agent Postero-Blecker, held an interest in a
portion of the Original Property at the northwest corner of
10600 South and 1300 East, intended for the location of a
combined service station, convenience store and carwash (the
"Chevron station").

(R. 050, R. 020). Chevron had no interest
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in any development other than that of the Chevron station. (R.
0108).
6.

Throughout this action, all property involved

was, and currently is, within unincorporated Salt Lake County.
(R. 004).
7.

Although the subject property is included in

Sandy City's zoning policy declaration area, Sandy City has not
enacted any ordinance approving annexation or expressing intent
to do so.

(R. 028).
8.

Paragraph 2 of a September 18, 1987 letter from

Sandy City to Salt Lake County states, "Sandy is currently
considering annexation."

(R. 023). Again, on October 14,

1987, Sandy, in a letter to the County Commission, stated
"Sandy is currently considering annexation."

(R. 028). On

November 19, 1987, a letter from the Sandy City Attorney to
counsel for the Individual Defendants, after suggesting a
meeting would be useful, stated "Of course, I do not mean to
imply by this letter that a decision on annexation or zoning
will be made in an informal meeting with your clients."

(R.

202).
9.

The Little Cottonwood District Development Plan,

a portion of the County Master Plan which includes the area in
question, was adopted in 1976 and expired by its terms in
1985.

(District Dev. Plan, Envelope 3, Doc. 11, p. 1 ) . The

District Plan was intended to guide short-term development
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through 1985.

( Id.)

Sandy City has approved commercial

development on property, directly across the street from the
subject property, which has the identical classification in the
plan.

(Envelope 3, Doc. 1, p. 3; Envelope 3, Doc. 11, map).
PROCEEDINGS AT THE COUNTY LEVEL
10.

On or about April 9, 1987, defendant Yeates

applied to the Salt Lake County Planning Commission for
rezoning of the Original Property from R-l-8 to C-2 and
R-M/Zc.

(R. 0015).

The Planning Commission approved the

rezoning, and the Salt Lake County Commission adopted a zoning
ordinance effecting the requested rezoning on August 5, 1988.
(R. 0005).
11.

On August 26, 1987, Defendant Postero-Blecker, on

behalf of Chevron, applied to Salt Lake County for a
Conditional Use permit for construction of the Chevron station
on approximately 0.7 acres of the Original Property (the
M

Chevron parcel").

The Chevron Station was the only

development proposed in the application.

(R. 0020).

Addendum

2.
12.

On October 13, 1987, the County Planning

Commission approved the conditional use application for the
Chevron station.

The Planning Commission's approval came after

two public hearings at which the Planning Commission heard
evidence.

(R. 0107-0115).

On October 14, 1987, Sandy City

appealed that decision to the Salt Lake County Commission.

-8-

13.

Evidence before the Planning Commission at the

time it made its decision to issue the conditional use permit
included the following:
(a)

testimony in support of the Chevron

application by local residents and neighbors of the
proposed Chevron station (R. 0109-0110);
(b)

testimony in support of the application by

representatives of the White City Community Council
and the United Association of Community Councils (R.
0110);
(c)

explanations of the benefits of the proposal

by Chevron representatives and the property owners (R.
0113; Envelope 3, Doc. Nos. 3, 7 ) ;
(d)

testimony concerning the safety hazard that

would be created by preserving the parcel for
residential use, due to the volume of traffic at the
intersection (R. 0110); and
(e)

recommendations of approval by various

administrative entities, including the county traffic
engineer and the Department of Environmental Health
(Envelope 3, Doc. No. 2 ) .
14.

On October 21, 1988, the County Commission denied

the City's request for appeal and upheld the Planning
Commission decision.
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15.

Chevron applied to the Salt Lake Building

Inspection Department for a building permit for its proposed
station upon Chevron parcel in the regular manner, and a
building permit was issued by the Department on or about:
November 5, 1987.

(R. 0179-0184). The building permit places

construction costs of Chevron's station at $175,000.
183).

(R.

Addendum 3.
16.

Chevron does not have and has never had at any

time any plan for second phase of development, its interest
being only the development of the Chevron station.
17.

(R. 0108).

The Chevron station, including the underlying

land, is owned and operated separately from all other potential
development on the northwest corner of 10600 South 1300 East,
and all permits for the station were obtained separately and
independently from any other development.

(R. 0180)

DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT
18.

On November 6, 1987, Sandy City filed its

verified complaint in Third District Court.

(R. 0002-0034).

The Sandy complaint does not appeal any permit decision other
than the Chevron permit.

( Id.)

Answers to the complaint

were filed by the defendants in December 1987 and January 1988.
19.

Motions for summary judgment were filed by all

defendants in January, 1988.

On January 26, 1988, the City

responded with its own motion for summary judgment.

Motions by

the City and Chevron were accompanied by affidavits and
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memoranda.

The City filed a Motion to Strike certain portions

of defendant's affidavits and other documents, and Chevron
filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Strike.
20.

On February 5, 1988, the Court heard the motions

for summary judgment and Motion to Strike.

(R. 219). Counter

affidavits were filed by the City and by Chevron on the day
prior to the hearing.
21.

On the day of the hearing, Defendant Salt Lake

County filed the record from the zoning and permit proceedings
before the Planning Commission

and County Commission.

On

February 18, 1988, Salt Lake County filed a Motion for
Certification of the County Record, together with supplemental
related documents, which motion was granted at the hearing on
February 25.

(R. 252). The record was certified and filed

with the Court on or about February 27, 1988.
22.

On March 15, 1988, the Court filed a Memorandum

Decision denying the City's Motion for Summary Judgment and
Motion to Strike and granting defendants Motions for Summary
Judgment and Salt Lake County's Motion for Certification.

On

April 8, 1988, the Court entered its formal Order and Judgment
of Dismissal.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
No material issues of fact existed before the District
Court, and the Court properly held that Chevron was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

The purported factual issues
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raised by Sandy are either immaterial in light of applicable
law, or involve an improper attempt to reopen the county
decision-making process and therefore outside the record.
1.

Applicable Law Supports Summary Judgment.

The

District Court did not err in interpreting Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-2-418 and related statutes.

Section 10-2-418 places

certain limits on County decisions to approve Murban
development" within a city's zoning policy declaration area if
the City is "willing" to annex the property.

The District

Court correctly held, as a matter of law, that the Chevron
conditional use application must be considered alone in
determining if it was "urban development;" and that Sandy had
not been "willing" to annex at the requisite time as required
to invoke the statute.
With either of these legal issues resolved in favor
of Chevron, the purported factual issues raised by Sandy
concerning willingness to annex or the project's connection
with other development become immaterial.

Likewise, because

trade fixtures and land can be excluded as a matter of law in
determining if the cost threshold of urban development is met,
the purported factual issue concerning Chevron's development
costs is also no longer material.

Issues of fact, if not

material, do not bar summary judgment.
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2.

The District Court Applied the Proper Standard

of Review.
Sandy appealed to the District Court from decisions of
the Salt Lake County Planning Commission and Board of County
Commissioners.

These bodies heard evidence, considered

voluminous documentation,
Chevron project.

and made decisions to approve the

Sandy's claim that factual issues exist

concerning compliance with County ordinances misstates the
applicable standard of review.

Review of County land use

decisions at the District Court level is not de novo, but
rather is review on the record to determine if the decision was
arbitrary and capricious.

The fact that Sandy City now

disputes the evidence before the County (or did so at the
County level) does not create any material factual issue.

The

only real issue is whether evidence existed to support the
County's decision, and this issue was proper for determination
on summary judgment.

The record supports the District Court's

decision.
3.

The Court Ruled Properly on Evidentiary Matters

The denial of Sandy's motion to strike was not error.
The Court may properly consider items in the record other than

This evidence and documentation makes up the majority of
the supplemental record now before the Court of Appeals.
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affidavits in determining a motion for summary judgment, as
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure makes clear.
The materials filed by Chevron were properly before the Court
in determining its motion.

The records filed by the County

constituted the official record of this proceeding before the
County Commission and County Planning Commission, and thus were
also properly considered by the Court in ruling on the defense
motions.

Finally, given the Court's determination of the legal

issues involved in favor of defendants, Rule 56(f) Utah R. Civ.
P. did not require the Court to grant Sandy further discovery.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY
INTERPRETED UTAH STATUTES
IN FINDING THAT THE CHEVRON STATION
DID NOT CONSTITUTE URBAN DEVELOPMENT
Sandy City claims that the District Court incorrectly
interpreted Utah Code Ann. §10-2-418.

That statute provides:

Urban development shall not be approved or
permitted within one-half mile of a
municipality in the unincorporated territory
which the municipality has proposed for
municipal expansion in its policy
declaration, if a municipality is willing to
annex the territory proposed for such
development under the standards and
requirements set forth in this chapter;
provided, however, that a property owner
desiring to develop or improve property within
the said one-half mile area may notify the
municipality in writing of said desire and
identify with particularity all legal and
factual barriers preventing an annexation to
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the municipality. At the end of 12
consecutive months from the filing with the
municipality of said notice and after a good
faith and diligent effort by said property
owner to annex, said property owner may
develop as otherwise permitted by law. Urban
development beyond one-half mile of a
municipality may be restricted or an impact
statement required when agreed to in an
interlocal agreement, under the provisions of
the Interlocal Co-operation Act. (Emphasis
added.)
The District Court correctly held that the County's
decision to allow the Chevron station did not violate Section
10-2-418.
Section 10-2-418 limits a countyfs discretion to
"approve or permit" development within one-half mile of a
municipal boundary only if three conditions are met:

(1) the

development must constitute "urban development" as defined in
Utah Code Ann. 10-1-104(11); (2) the development must be
within an area proposed for municipal expansion in the
municipality's annexation policy declaration; and (3) the
municipality must be willing to annex the development.

Neither

the first nor the third element required for the statute to be
3
applicable were present below, as a matter of law.
The

Chevron agrees that the Chevron parcel is within Sandy's
annexation policy declaration area. However, as set forth in
II, infra, the policy declaration is merely a general
declaration of intent to annex at some future point, not
current "willingness."

-15-

District Court correctly concluded, as a matter of law, that
the Chevron station is not urban development, and that Sandy
was not willing to annex the parcel at the time of the
application.
A.

THE CHEVRON APPLICATION WAS THE ONLY DECISION TO
"APPROVE OR PERMIT" DEVELOPMENT BEFORE THE COURT
It is important to note that the urban development

statute must initially be triggered by a county decision to
fT

approve or permit" urban development.

§ 10-2-418.

Utah Code Ann.

This threshold requirement has two implications

for this case.

First, the statute cannot apply to the County

Commission's initial decision to rezone the original property
from R-8 to C-2 and Rm/zc.

The Commission's decision to rezone

the property did not confer any ability upon the former owners
to develop it absent further permitting.

Similarly, Chevron

was required by county ordinance to obtain a conditional use
permit before constructing its facility; the new zoning alone
did not allow it to begin construction once it purchased its
parcel.

Furthermore, the urban development statute is keyed to

the costs of proposed development.

Because development costs

cannot be ascertained at the zoning stage, the statute cannot

See II., infra p. 21
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be applied at that point.

Rezoning, by itself, is clearly not

a decision to "approve or permit" urban development.

Section

10-2-418 does not apply to the County Commission's initial
decision to change the zoning of the property.
The more important implication of the "approve or
permit" language in Section 10-2-418 is that the Chevron
conditional use application must be considered separately in
determining if "urban development" was proposed.

Sandy seeks

at length to tar Chevron with the brush of construction
proposed by other owners as to other land, yet the only county
decision to "approve or permit" development that Sandy chose to
appeal to the District Court in this action involved Chevron1s
conditional use application.

It is undisputed that Chevron's

application for a conditional use permit involved only the
construction of the Chevron facility, not any further
development.

In granting the application, the Planning

Commission and County Commission approved only the Chevron
facility, nothing else.

Sandy City appealed to the District

Court only the County's decision concerning the Chevron
application, not any other decision.

This decision to "approve

or permit" development is the only one relevant to determining
whether urban development was present.

The Chevron station is

thus the only development that the County needed to consider in
determining if urban development was present.
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B.

THE COUNTY AND THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONSIDERED
THE CHEVRON PROPOSAL ON A STAND ALONE BASIS
Sandy City claims that the statutory definition of

urban development required the County, and the District Court
on appeal, to consider potential development outside the
Chevron parcel on the original property in deciding whether to
grant Chevron's application.

Section 10-1-104(11) defines

"urban development" as "a housing development involving more
than 15 residential units with an average of less than one acre
per residential unit or a commercial or industrial development
for which cost projections exceed $750,000 for any or all
phases."

Sandy contends that the Chevron application was only

a "phase" of a single larger development.

Particularly, Sandy

believes that the value of the proposed McDonald's restaurant
on an adjacent: parcel should have been combined with Chevron's
in determining whether the $750,000 cost threshold was met.
The District Court did not err in concluding, as a
matter of law, that the County properly considered only the
costs of the proposed Chevron facility in determining whether
to approve it.

The undisputed evidence before the Court

demonstrated that the Chevron application involved a
development unto itself, not a phase of a larger unitary
development.

The Chevron station was proposed to be designed

by Chevron, constructed by Chevron, owned by Chevron and
operated by Chevron.

Once Chevron completed its purchase of

its 0.7 acre parcel of essentially raw land from the owners of
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the original property, any control by them over the design and
development of the parcel ceased.

Sandy had undertaken no suit

against McDonalds at the time of the subject proceedings below.
Sandy's interpretation of the statute is also
unworkable in practice.

It would require County authorities to

assess whether speculative future development by separate
owners might in the future exceed the $750,000 threshold.

Each

individual owner of a parcel would be hostage to his/her
neighbors1 development plans for nearby parcels.

No matter how

modest the individual's development plans might be, approval
would be precluded if a common grantee's prior development
approached or exceeded the threshold.

The statute is intended

to apply to phased developments undertaken by single owners.
The District Court correctly held that the Chevron application
should be considered alone.
C.

THE CHEVRON STATION, AS A MATTER OF LAW, DOES NOT
REACH THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT THRESHOLD
Sandy also argues that, even if considered alone, the

Chevron application exceeds the $750,000 threshold for "cost
projections" set by Utah Code Ann.

10-1-104(11).

This

argument is based on a mistaken conception of what costs should
be included in making this determination.

Sandy argues that

This is particularly true where, as here, the Chevron
application was filed independently and where the Sandy appeal
involved only the Chevron application.
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land and trade fixture costs must be included in the
determination.

Indeed, Sandy must do so, since without

either, its argument must fail.
Sandyfs contention that land costs must be included
would cause the urban development statute to have an
inequitable and obviously unintended effect.

Land costs vary

dramatically, depending on location, date of purchase, and
purpose and manner of acquisition.

If land costs are included,

a project built on land purchased years in the past might be
allowed, while an identical project on recently purchased (and
thus expensive) land would be barred.

Inclusion of trade

fixtures in the cost determination has an equally distorting
effect.

A million dollar machine could bar construction of one

building while an identical one could proceed.

Statutes should

be given a reasonable interpretation, not one that will cause
an arbitrary or unreasonable result. Curtis v. Harmon
Electronics, Inc., 575 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1978).

The urban

development statute is intended to reach developments only when
they reach a certain character and size.

Sandy's

interpretation would instead limit much development on the
basis of arbitrary costs not related to the size of development.

Similarly, the owner of a choice parcel (or a sufficiently
large one) could be prevented from any construction - even a
lemonade stand - while owners of less valuable parcels could
develop at will.
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The only logical measure of development costs is
construction costs.

This measure is consistent, easily

ascertained--by viewing the building permit--and comports with
the statute.

Fixtures and land, as a matter of law, should

not be included in the statutory determination.

If either is

omitted, no material factual issue on value exists.

Without

land or fixture costs, the Chevron station1s projected costs
are undisputedly well below the $750,000 threshold, even if
Sandy CityTs contentions concerning value of the Chevron
o

station are taken as true.

Chevron is therefore entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.
It is perfectly logical that the 10-1-104(11) is
concerned with the impact of improvements on an area - not the
impact of the land which would be there in any event.

To

illustrate, if a very minor and unobtrusive improvement were
placed on a $1,000,000.00 property the impact of the
improvement would be slight; and there would be no reason for
10-1-104(11) to apply simply by reason of the land value.
II.
SANDY'S FAILURE TO EXPRESS WILLINGNESS TO ANNEX
ALSO PRECLUDES APPLICATION OF THE
URBAN DEVELOPMENT STATUTE

Chevron's building permit places construction costs at
$175,000. Addendum 3
o

See III.A., infra p.

.
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A.,

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY REQUIRED
EXPRESS WILLINGNESS TO ANNEX
Section 10-2-418 restricts "urban development" within

one-half mile of a municipality where the property involved is
M

in the unincorporated territory which the municipality has

proposed for municipal expansion in its policy declaration, .if
the municipality is willing to annex the territory . . . .ff
(emphasis added).

The District Court interpreted this language

to require that the municipality indicate its willingness to
annex in addition to having included the area in its policy
declaration, and held that Sandy had not unequivocally done
so.

Sandy argues that inclusion of territory within the

municipalityfs policy declaration area in itself satisfies the
statutory requirement that Sandy be willing to annex the
property.
Sandy's argument would make surplusage of the
independent requirement in the statute that the municipality be
willing to annex.

It is a basic axiom of statutory

construction that legislation should be interpreted to give
effect to all language contained in the statute.
of Lynnwood, 583 P.2d 1197 (Wash. 1978).

Gross v. City

If the

municipality's annexation policy declaration alone sufficed, a
separate statutory requirement of willingness would not have
been necessary.

However, the policy declaration reflects a

municipality's projected future growth over a number of years;
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annexation of a particular parcel may be years in the future.
Accordingly, an independent requirement in the statute of
willingness was necessary to prevent undue delay of development
merely because a parcel may be within a general policy
declaration.
The only logical form the required willingness can
take is an ordinance or resolution approved by a vote of the
body authorized to approve annexation.
§ 10-2-415.
quickly.

See Utah Code Ann.

Such a commitment could be made simply and

As a practical matter, the property owner needs such

an official expression to determine if a petition to annex is
necessary, and which governmental entity needs to be approached
concerning zoning and permitting.
Absent such commitment, under Sandyfs interpretation
of the statute, a property owner could be prevented from
developing his/her property even though the municipality might
have no present desire to annex the property.

The trial court

instead adopted an interpretation of the statute that would
accord with accepted principles of statutory interpretation,
prevent confusion and undue delay, but still fully protect the
interests of the municipality involved.
should be upheld.

See V., infra p. 34.
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This interpretation

III.
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY UPHELD
THE COUNTY'S DECISION ON THE RECORD
Sandy City additionally claims that the District Court
erred as a matter of law in upholding the Planning Commission
and County Commission's factual determination that Chevron's
application met applicable requirements.

Sandy's argument is

based upon Section 19.84.090 of the Salt Lake County
Ordinances, which provides:
19.84.090

Conditions for Approval.

The planning commission shall not
authorize a conditional use permit unless the
evidence presented is such as to establish:
A.
That the proposed use at the
particular location is necessary or desirable
to provide a service or facility which will
contribute to the general well-being of the
neighborhood and the community and
B.
That such use will not, under the
circumstances of the particular case, be
detrimental to the health, safety or general
welfare of persons residing or working in the
vicinity, or injurious to property or
improvements in the vicinity; and
C.
That the proposed use will comply
with the regulations and conditions specified
in this title for such use; and
D.
That the proposed use will conform to
the intent of the county master plan. (Prior
code § 22-31-2(5)(part)).
Sandy contends that the evidence before the County
entities was insufficient to support their decision to grant
the permit.

This argument demonstrates Sandy City's lack of
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understanding of the standard of review to be employed by the
District Court in reviewing the decisions of the Salt Lake
County Planning Commission and Salt Lake County Commission.
A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that

zoning decisions by counties are legislative in nature and that
the courts should not interfere with judgment of the local
jurisdiction unless there is no reasonable basis whatsoever to
justify the decision.

Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corporation,

398 P.2d 27 (Utah 1965); Crestwood Holladay Home Owners Assn.
v. Engh Floral Co., 545 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1976).

The same

deferential standard of review at the district court level
applies to county decisions to grant conditional use permits.
Cottonwood Heights Citizens Assn. v. Board of County
Commissioner of Salt Lake County, 593 P.2d 138 (Utah 1979).
Review is limited to the record at the County level; the
complaining party is not entitled to a de novo hearing on
factual issues considered by the County.

Peatross v. Board of

County Commissioners, 555 P.2d 281 (Utah 1976).
B.

THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO
SUPPORT THE COUNTY DECISION
Contrary to Sandy's assertions in its appellate brief,

the Planning Commission and County Commission did not have
before them significant evidence concerning each required
element of County Ordinance 19.84.090.

Members of the White

City Community Council, which includes the area in question,
-25-

testified to community support and desire for the proposal.
The County Traffic Engineer provided evidence that no
additional traffic problems would be caused by the Chevron
station, and that traffic safety might well be improved.

The

Planning Commission filed indicated approval by all county
health and safety agencies.

Representatives of Chevron and of

the sellers also testified as to the community benefits
accruing from the proposal.
More importantly, the Planning Commission had
voluminous documentation before it concerning the proposed
Chevron station.

This documentation, which makes up scores of

pages of the record before both the District Court and this
Court, included plans, correspondence, responses to County
inquiries, and documents concerning compliance with the County
master plan.

The County entities had ample evidence before

them to support their decision to grant the permits.

On the

basis of the record before it, the District Court justifiably
held as a matter of law that the County had a reasonable basis
for its decision and that its decision was not arbitrary and
capricious.

Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 398 P.2d 27

(Utah 1965).
Chevron does not dispute that Sandy introduced
contrary evidence at the County level.

It is irrelevant for

purposes of summary judgment that factual disputes may have
existed at the County level concerning the necessity and
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community benefit of the proposed project.

The only issue

before the District Court was whether the County entities had
any evidence before them supporting the decision they made.
The District Court could decide this issue from the record; the
issue was therefore proper for summary judgment.

The Utah

Supreme Court has said of District Court review of County
zoning decisions:
[Ojrdinarily, where the lower tribunal, acting
within the scope of its authority, has
conducted a hearing and arrived at a decision,
the reviewing court will examine only the
Certified records; and will not interfere with
matters of discretion or upset the actions of
the lower tribunal except upon a showing that
the tribunal acted in excess of its authority
or in a manner so clearly outside of reason
that the action must be deemed arbitrary and
capricious. Peatross v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 555 P.2d at 284.
Sandy City would have the Courts interfere with
reasonable legislative decisions of the County Commission based
on substantial evidence.

The District Court employed a proper

standard of review, and chose not to so interfere.

Its

decision should be upheld.
C.

THE CHEVRON PERMIT COMPLIES WITH THE MASTER PLAN
In its appeal, Sandy City argues that the proposed

commercial use is inconsistent with the County Master
Plan.

Interestingly enough, Sandy itself has permitted
significant commercial development directly across the street
from the Chevron, on a tract with an identical designation in
the master plan.
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The relevant ordinance merely requires a finding that the
proposed use conforms to the intent of the County Master
Plan.

Ordinance Section 19.84.090(D).

As noted by the

Planning Commission, the County Master Plan was intended to
provide for commercial development at major intersections.

The

Planning Commission also found that the character of the
intersection has changed to commercial since the adoption of
the Master Plan.

More importantly, the Little Cottonwood

Master Plan was a ten-year plan that expired by its terms in
1985.

Since it was formulated in 1976, enormous growth has

taken place in the south county.

County officials may properly

take notice of conditions in their jurisdiction in making their
decisions.

A county is not bound by an outdated Master Plan in

its land use decisions.
410 P.2d 764 (Utah 1966).

Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corporation,
Approval of the conditional use is

consistent with the intent of the County Master Plan, and
therefore does not violate Section 19.84.090(D).
This conclusion also finds ample support in the case
law.

Courts hold that "comprehensive" or "master" plans are

merely advisory.

A statutory requirement that zoning decisions

conform to the intent of a master plan "does not require that
governing bodies, as a matter of law, zone their land as it
appears on their land use map. . . . "

Rather, the governing

body must "make a factual inquiry into whether the requested
zoning ordinance or amendment reflects the goals of, and takes
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into account those factors in, the comprehensive plan in light
of the present circumstances surrounding the request." Bone
v. City of Lewiston, 693 P.2d 1046, 1052 (Idaho 1984); Town
of Bedford v. Mt. Kisco, 33 N.Y.2d 178, 351 N.Y.S.2d 129, 306
N.E.2d 155 (1973) (zoning amendment was not inconsistent with
10-year old master plan, in view of intervening change in
character of area).

Furthermore, Chevron's proposed use is

consistent with the present C-2 zoning for the property.

This

zoning change is effective to modify the County Master Plan.
See Town of Bedford v. Mt. Kisco, supra.
IV.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS A PROPER
REMEDY UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES
A.

NO MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT BAR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Once the legal issues raised in this appeal are

determined, the purported material issues of fact raised by
Sandy dissolve.

Summary judgment is not precluded where

factual issues exist, but only where a material fact is
genuinely controverted.

Heglar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619

P.2d 1390 (Utah 1980).

The purported issues of fact raised by

Sandy - valuation, willingness to annex, and evidence before
the County - are simply not material in light of the applicable
law set forth ab ove.

The District CourtTs correctly held that

no material issues of fact existed, and that Chevron was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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B.

THE COURTTS EVIDENTIARY RULINGS WERE CORRECT
1.

Denial of Sandy's Motion to Strike Was Proper.

Sandy City contends that the District Court erred in denying
Sandy City's Motion to Strike and in ostensibly relying upon
evidence claimed inadmissible by Sandy.

This argument by

Sandy, and the Motion to Strike itself, are both deceptive and
ill-founded in law.

The initial misconception that Sandy makes

is that a movant for summary judgment may make a statement of
undisputed fact only if the statement is supported by
affidavit.

In fact, Rule 56(c) Utah R. Civ. P., allows the

Court to rely upon pleadings and other materials in the record
in determining if summary judgment is proper.
The extent of Sandy City's misconception of the law is
revealed by Sandy's objections to statements taken from its
own pleadings.

A glaring example is Sandy's objection to

Chevron*s statement of legal description of the property. 12

Sandy Motion to Strike, r. 175.
Other examples of Sandy's objections to Chevron's use of
Sandy's own verified statements include but are not limited
to: objection to Chevron statement that the Sellers applied
for rezoning; objection to statement that the County Commission
approved the rezoning; the statement that the sellers sought to
rezone the property; objection to statement of date the
rezoning ordinance was published; and the purpose of the
Chevron conditional use application (Sandy City Motion to
Strike, r. 175). These statements are, respectively, taken
directly from the Sandy verified complaint at UH 8, 10, 8, 10
and Exhibit D. Even were Sandy not estopped to object to its
own statements, these statements may be used for purposes of
summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c).
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This legal description is identical to that contained in
paragraph 7 of Sandy's verified complaint, yet Sandy considers
it hearsay and without proper foundation or oath.

As part of

the pleadings before the court, facts of this type may clearly
be considered under Rule 56(c).

In any event, Sandy City is

estopped to object to its own judicial statements.

See Sailes

v. Jones, 499 P.2d 721 (Ariz. App. 1972).
Sandy's objections to other statements are either
unfounded in law or irrelevant.

For instance, Sandy claims

that the District Court relied on inadmissible evidence in
concluding that the City had failed to express its willingness
to annex.

As set forth in Section II, supra, § 10-2-418

requires an affirmative and binding declaration of willingness
to annex in addition to the policy declaration.

All evidence

before the Court indicated that no such formal declaration of
willingness had been made.

For instance, three separate

documents filed with the District Court by Sandy stated only
that the City was considering annexation.

The only statement

of purported willingness to annex was an obviously non-binding
statement made by counsel for Sandy at one of the Planning
Commission hearings.

Chevron's statement -- and the Court's

finding -- that Sandy had not declared willingness to annex in
the manner required by statute was justified.
2.

Evidence of Value.

Sandy states that Chevron's

contentions concerning the costs of the Chevron project before

-31-

the Court were unsupported.

Sandy neglects to mention that

Chevron submitted the affidavit of David E. Jenkins (to which
no objection was or has been made by Sandy) specifically
concerning valuation of the property.

Mr. Jenkins, the

consulting engineer in charge of Chevron's property
development, specifically indicated construction costs at the
$175,000 contained in the building permit.

(Addendum 3).

More

importantly, Sandy's objection is irrelevant because, as a
matter of law, land and fixture costs are not included in the
"costs of development" for the purposes of the urban
development statute.

Even if Sandy's evidence of valuation is

correct, the Chevron station is not urban development.

Chevron

is entitled to judgment on this issue as a matter of law;
Sandy's objection is immaterial.
C.

THE COUNTY RECORDS WERE PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT
Sandy City also assigns error to the District Court's

consideration of certain documents submitted to the District
Court by defendant Salt Lake County.

The documents involved

make up the Supplemental Record in this action, and primarily
consist of Planning Commission and County Commission documents
concerning the applications in question, as well as copies of
the County Master Plan.

These documents were submitted by the

County defendants in accordance with Peatross v. Board of
County Commissioners, supra, where the Utah Supreme Court
held of review of County decisions:
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"ordinarily, where the

lower tribunal, acting within the scope of its authority, has
conducted a hearing and arrived at a decision, the reviewing
court will examine only the certified records", 555 P.2d at
284.
The District Court properly considered the County
records in making its decision.

In reviewing the actions of a

county legislative body, records of that body are properly
before the Court.

Peatross, supra.

The County records are

not affidavits subject to the filing deadlines contained in
Rule 6(e), Utah R. Civ. P., as Sandy argues.

Instead, as

records of proceedings below, they were proper for
consideration for the Court at any time during its review of
the County decision. 13

Sandy had full access to all

materials from County files; it in fact submitted portions of
the County records with its own memoranda.
Sandyfs true problem with the County records is not
when they were admitted, but rather what they reveal--a
plethora of evidence supporting the County entities' decision
to permit Chevron to build its station.

After Sandy objected to their introduction at the summary
judgment hearing, defendant Salt Lake County filed a written
motion for their certification and admission, which the Court
granted and which Sandy did not appeal.
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V.
FAILURE TO ALLOW DISCOVERY
DID NOT PREJUDICE SANDY CITY
The District Court did not abuse its discretion by
granting summary judgment to defendants prior to allowing
certain discovery requested by Sandy City.

Sandy asserts that

the Court's decision to grant summary judgment violated Rule 56
(f), Utah R. Civ. P., which permits a court to deny or continue
a motion for summary judgment where the opposing party cannot
present facts essential to justify opposition to this motion.
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f).

The party opposing summary judgment

must present by affidavit the dispositive facts it believes
discovery would disclose.

Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co.,

745 P.2d 838 (Utah App. 1987).
Sandy's counsel filed an affidavit with the lower
court claiming that discovery would have allowed it to develop
certain information sufficient to defeat summary judgment in
favor of defendants.

Review of the facts that Sandy believes

discovery would disclose indicates that none would change the
outcome of this action.
Sandy initially argues that it did not have certain
County Commission minutes at the time.

These minutes were

subsequently certified to the District Court and were a portion
of the record available to the court in making its decision.
Second, Sandy argues that discovery would disclose that the
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zoning and conditional use applications did not meet the
standards necessary for approval under county ordinances. 14
Sandy's contention shows its misconception of the standard of
review of County decisions.

The Planning Commission and County

Commission had evidence before them that the Chevron station
complied with ordinance requirements.
and did, provide contrary evidence.

Sandy had the chance to,
On appeal to the District

Court, the only relevant question was whether the Planning
Commission's decision to grant the permit was so unsupportable
on the evidence before it, as to be arbitrary, capricious or
unreasonable.

Additional evidence going to the merits of the

Chevron project, which Sandy contends discovery would reveal,
has no relevance to what was essentially an appellate review by
the District Court of the County's decision.
Finally, Sandy argues that discovery would reveal
additional information concerning development costs and
compliance with state subdivision statutes.

As Section I of

Chevron's argument makes clear, the Chevron station was
properly considered alone in determining if it was urban
development.

There is no question, even assuming Sandy's cost

projections are true, that the Chevron station did not meet the

For instance, Sandy stated that discovery would reveal
that the Chevron station was in fact unnecessary, undesirable
and detrimental to local safety, health and welfare. See
County Ord. § 19.84.090. It is unquestioned, however, that the
Planning Commission did hear evidence to the contrary.
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$750,000 threshold for urban development if the "urban
development" definition is correctly applied.

Accordingly,

further discovery on the issue of valuation would have been
fruitless.

The issue of compliance with subdivision statutes

was not raised in Sandy's complaint or opposition to
defendants1 motions and was not before the Court.
Under the controlling law, the defendantsT motions for
summary judgment would properly have been granted even if Sandy
had discovered the facts it claims it would have.

The District

Court therefore did not abuse its discretion in hearing the
summary judgment motions prior to discovery by Sandy.
VI.
POLICY FACTORS FAVOR UPHOLDING
THE DISTRICT COURT
Sandy City places great emphasis upon the purported
anti-development policies underlying the urban development
statute.

Sandy's view of the policies behind Section 10-2-418

is too limited.

It is correct that one of the purposes behind

section 10-2-418 is protection of the interests of
municipalities.

But the statute balances these interests

against the interests of those owning property near a
municipality and the interests of the County.

Municipal

interests are protected because developments of a certain
character--those constituting urban development--will be
restricted if the municipality is willing to annex the
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property.

The other side of this policy is that property

owners may develop under County supervision where annexation is
uncertain or where the project is not large enough to
constitute urban development.
Sandy would have the benefit of the statute without
accepting its limitations.

In seeking a conditional use permit

for its service station, Chevron went to the governmental
authority having unquestioned jurisdiction over the Chevron
parcel--Salt Lake County.

Chevron's permit application

concerned the Chevron parcel and station alone, not any other
proposed development.

At the time Chevron applied, it had

received no binding commitment or declaration from Sandy City
that Sandy desired to annex the property as a precondition of
development.

As the District Court recognized, the Chevron

station simply does not, as a matter of law, fall within the
statute.
Sandy additionally complains that the varying interest
of the Municipality, the County, and area residents could only
be "balanced" through the annexation process, in which public
hearings would be held and citizens heard.
what in fact took place.

This "balancing" is

At least four public hearings were

held concerning the future of the property.

Interested

parties, including Sandy, had additional opportunities to
submit written comments to the Planning Commission and County
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Commission.

Sandy took full advantage of these forums.

Sandy's true complaint is not that its interests were not
properly balanced, as it asserts.

Its complaint is instead

that the County Commission, after hearing the parties and
reviewing the evidence, came to a different conclusion than
Sandy would have.

This disagreement provides no basis for

overriding the legislative determinations of Salt Lake County
concerning property with the County.
CONCLUSION
Chevron is caught in a jurisdictional turf battle
between two governmental entities.

It sought approval from the

governmental entity--Salt Lake County--within whose boundaries
the Chevron parcel lay.
jurisdiction to act.

That was the only entity with

That approval was granted after

substantial review, comment and consideration of evidence.

The

record on appeal discloses that this approval was granted in
compliance with law.

The purported issues of fact raised by

Sandy are immaterial; even if resolved in Sandy's favor Chevron
would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The County's

decision concerning property within County jurisdiction was
entitled to substantial deference upon review by the District
Court.

The District Court did so.

Chevron should be upheld.
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Its decision in favor of
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ADDENDUM

Utah Rules of C i v i l Procedure
Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending party, A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(0 When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
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Utah Code A n n o t a t e d

10-2-418. Urban development restrictions.
Urban development shall not be approved or permitted within one-half mile
of a municipality in the unincorporated territory which the municipality has
proposed for municipal expansion in its policy declaration, if a municipality is
willing to annex the territory proposed for such development under the standards and requirements set forth in this chapter; provided, however, that a
property owner desiring to develop or improve property within the said onehalf mile area may notify the municipality in writing of said desire and identify with particularity all legal and factual barriers preventing an annexation
to the municipality. At the end of 12 consecutive months from the filing with
the municipality of said notice and after a good faith and diligent effort by
said property owner to annex, said property owner may develop as otherwise
permitted by law. Urban development beyond one-half mile of a municipality
may be restricted or an impact statement required when agreed to in an
interlocal agreement, under the provisions of the Interlocal Co-operation Act.

ADDENDUM ICs

Utah Code A n n o t a t e d

10-1-104. Definitions.
As used in this act:
(1) "Municipal" or "municipalities" means any city of the first class,
city of the second class, city of the third class, or town in the state of Utah,
but unless the context otherwise provides, the term or terms do not include counties, school districts, or any other special purpose governments.
(2) "Governing body" means collectively the legislative body and the
executive of any municipality. Unless otherwise provided:
(a) In cities of the first and second class, the governing body is the
city commission;
(b) In cities of the third class, the governing body is the city council;
(c) In towns the governing body is the town council.
(3) "City" shall include cities of the first class, cities of the second class
or cities of the third class or may refer cumulatively to all such cities.
(4) 'Town" means any town as defined in § 10-2-301.
(5) "Recorder," unless clearly inapplicable, shall include and apply to
town clerks.
(6) "Provisions of law" shall include other statutes of the state of Utah
and ordinances, rules and regulations properly adopted by any municipality unless the construction is clearly contrary to the intent of state law.
(7) "Contiguous" means abutting directly on the existing boundary of
the annexing municipality. "Directly" includes separation by a street,
alley, public right-of-way, creek, river or the right-of-way of a railroad or
other public service corporation, or by lands owned by the municipality,
by some other political subdivision of the state or by the state.
(8) "Affected entities" means a county, municipality or other entity
possessing taxation powers within a county, whose territory, service delivery or revenue will be directly and significantly affected by a proposed
boundary change involving a municipality or other local entity.
(9) "Peninsula" means an area of unincorporated territory surrounded
on more than one-half of its boundary distance, but not completely, by
incorporated territory and situated so that the length of a line drawn
across the unincorporated area from an incorporated area to an incorporated area on the opposite side shall be less than 25% of the total aggregate boundaries of the unincorporated area.
(10) "Island" means unincorporated territory completely surrounded by
incorporated area of one or more municipalities.
(11) "Urban development" means a housing subdivision involving
more than 15 residential units with an average of less than one acre per
residential unit or a commercial or industrial development for which cost
projections exceed $750,000 for any or all phases.
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S a l e Lake County O r d i n a n c e s

Chapter 19-34
CONDITIONAL USES
Sections:
19.84.010
19.84.020
19.84.030
19.84.040
19.84.050
19.84.060
19.84.070
19.84.080
19.84.090
19.84.100
19.84.110
19.84.120
19.84.130
19.84.140

Purpose.
Conditional use permit
required when.
Application requirements—
Fee.
Public hearing.
Determination of commission.
Delegation of approval
authority.
Policies established.
Review by planning
commission.
Conditions for approval.
Appeal of planning director
decision.
Appeal of planning commission
decision.
Inspection.
Time limit.
Sale of alcoholic beverages.

19.84.010 Purpose.
The purpose of this chapter is to allow the
proper integration into the county of uses which
may be suitable only in certain locations in the
county or zoning district, or only if such uses are
designed or laid out on the site in a panicular
manner. (Prior code § 22-31-1)
Conditional use permit required
when.
A conditional use permit shall be required for
all uses listed as conditional uses in the district
regulations or elsewhere in this title. A conditional use permit may be revoked upon failure in
compliance with conditions precedent to the
original approval of the permit. (Prior code §
22-3l-2(pan))

19.84.030 Application requirements—Fee.
A. Application for a conditional use permit
shall be made by the property owner or certified
agent thereof to the planning commission.
B. Accompanying Documents. Detailed site
plans drawn to scale and other drawings necessary to assist the planning commission in arriving at an appropriate decision.
C. Fee. The fee for any conditional use permit
shall be as provided for in Section 3.52.040 of
this code. (Prior code § 22-31-2(1)—(3))
19.84.040 Public hearing.
No public hearing need be held: however, a
hearing may be held when the planning commission shall deem such a hearing to be necessary in
the public interest.
A. The planning commission may delegate to
the planning director the holding of the hearing.
B. The planning director shall submit to the
planning commission a record of the hearing.
together with a report offindingsand recommendations relative thereto, for the consideration of
the planning commission.
C. Such hearing, if deemed necessary, shall be
held not more than thirty days from the date of
application. The panicular time and place shall
be established by the planning director.
D. The planning director shall publish a
notice of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the county not less than ten days prior
to the date of the hearing. Failure of property
owners to receive notice of the hearing shall in no
way affect the validity of action taken. (Prior
code §22-31-2(4))

19.84.020

19.84.050 Determination of commission.
The planning commission may permit a conditional use to be located within any district in
which the panicular conditional use is permitted
by the use regulations of this title. In authorizing
any conditional use the planning commission
shall impose such requirements and conditions

as may be necessary for the protection of adjacent properties and the public welfare. Such conditions of approval may include but shall not be
limited to limitations or requirements as to the
height, size, location and design of structures,
landscaping. density, ingress-egress, fencing,
parking or lighting. Height, density and size
requirements for structures in each zone are
maximums and may be reduced or modified as
conditions to the approval of any conditional use
application. (Ord. of 5/29/85: prior code §
22-31-2(5)(part))

B. That such use will not. under the circumstances of the particular case, be detrimental to
the health, safety or general welfare of persons
residing or working in the vicinity, or injurious to
property or improvements in the vicinity: and
C. That the proposed use will comply with the
regulations and conditions specified in this title
for such use: and
D. That the proposed use will conform to the
intent of the county master plan. (Prior code $
22-3l-2(5)(part))
19.84.100

Appeal of planning director
decision.
Any person shall have therightto appeal the
decision of the planning director to the planning
commission by filing a letter with the planning
commission within five days of the planning
director's action, stating the reason for the appeal
and requesting a hearing before the planning
commission at the earliest regular meeting of the
commission. (Priorcode § 22-31-2(5)(part))

19.84.060 Delegation of approval authority.
The planning commission may delegate to the
planning director the authority to approve, modify or deny all or part of the conditional uses set
forth in this title. (Prior code § 22-31-2(5)(part))
19.34.070 Policies established.
The planning commission shall establish policies regarding landscaping, fencing, lighting,
ingress-egress, height of buildings, etc.. to guide
the decision of the planning director to ensure
consistency in the issuance of conditional use
permits. (Prior code § 22-3l-2(5)(pan))

19.84.110

Appeal of planning commission
decision.
A. Any person shall have therightto appeal to
the board of county commissioners any decision
rendered by the planning commission byfilingin
writing, and in triplicate, stating the reasons for
the appeal with the board of county commissioners within ten days following the date upon
which the decision is made by the planning commission. After receiving the appeal the county
commission may reaffirm the planning commission decision or set a date for a public hearing.
B. Notification of Planning Commission.
The board of county commissioners shall notify
the planning commission of the date of the
review, in writing, at least seven days preceding
the date set for hearing so that the planning commission may prepare the record for the hearing.
C. Determination by Board of County Commissioners. The board of county commissioners
after proper review of the decision of the planning commission may affirm, reverse, alter or

19.84.080 Review by planning commission.
The planning director is authorized to bring
any conditional use permit application before
the planning commission if, in his opinion, the
general public interest will be better served by
review of the planning commission. (Priorcode §
22-3i-2(5)(part))
19.84.090

Conditions for approval.

The planning commission shall not authorize
a conditional use permit unless the evidence presented is such as to establish:
A. That the proposed use at the particular
location is necessary or desirable to provide a
service or facility which will contribute to the
general well-being of the neighborhood and the
community: and
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19.84.110

remand for further review and consideration any
action taken by the planning commission. (Prior
code § 22-3i-2(5)(part))

2. That the proposed use at a particular location is necessary and desirable to provide the
service or facility which will contribute to the
general well-being of the neighborhood and the
community: and
3. That such use will not. under the circumstances of the particular case, be detrimental to
the health, safety or general welfare of persons
residing or working in the vicinity, orinjurious to
property or improvements in the vicinity: and
4. That the proposed use will comply with
regulations and conditions specified in this title
for such use: and
5. That the proposed use will conform to the
intent of the county master plan.
B. AH conditional use permits for uses dispensig alcoholic beverages to be consumed on the
premises are subject to an annual review, and all
applications for a conditional use permit for consumption of liquor or beer on the premises must
be accompanied by a payment of fees as provided
in Section 3.52.040. The fees are considered reasonable because of the costs of investigation and
studies necessary for the administration hereof.
C. The granting of any permit by the planning
commission to dispense alcoholic beverages is
subject to review by the county commission. The
denial of any permit by the planning commission
to dispense alcoholic beverages is subject to
review by the district courts. All appeals of planning commission decisions to the board of county commissioners or the district courts must be
filed with the appropriate body within thirty days
from the date of the planning commission decision. (Ord. 804.1982: prior code § 22-31-4)

19,84.120 Inspection.
Following the issuance of a conditional use
permit by the planning commission the director
of building inspection shall approve an application for a building permit pursuant to Chapter
19.94 of this title and shall ensure that development is undertaken and completed in compliance with the permits. (Prior code §
22-31-2(5)(part))
19-84.130 Time limit.
Unless there is a substantial action under a
conditional use permit within a maximum
period of one year of its issuance, the conditional
use permit shall expire. The planning commission may grant, a maximum extension of six
months under exceptional circumstances. (Prior
code § 22-31-2(5)(pan))
19.84.140 Sale of alcoholic beverages.
A. The planning commission shall authorize
a conditional use permit to sell alcoholic beverages except Class A beer outlets and Class B
beer outlets where it is determined by the planning commission:
1. That the use is not in the immediate proximity of any school, church, library, public playground, or park:
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AFFIDAVIT

/being duly swoirn/ depose and say that I (we) ara the

er/authorized agent of the owner of the property involved in this application and
t the foregoing statements and answers contained herein in the attached plans and
*r exhibits thoroughly, to the best of'my (our) ability/ present the cirgument in
alf of the application requested herewith and that the statments and information
/e referred to are in all respects true and correct to the be^rt^ of n(y^pur) knowledge
belief.
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77^/W^^
Notary Public Residing in. /
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AGENT AUTHORIZATION
re)

the owner(s) of the real property^
Salt Lake County/ Utah/ do hereby
as my (our) agent to represent me

>int

with regard to this application affecting the above described real property/ and
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to appear on my(our) behalf before any

ity Boards considering this application.
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V a l u a t i o n Fee
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